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LAWFUL RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION?  
  
  THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION’S ALMIGHTY SPILLAGE OVER THE GRAYER NON-
MINISTERIAL AREAS 
  
  
  
 Oliver Encarnacion 
  
  
  
  
  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  
  
  
  In response to historical societal movements producing differential treatment of race, 
gender, and sexual orientation, courts across the nation have both granted and refused exceptions 
for religious groups from civil rights laws against such discrimination.1 While Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) protects against discrimination based on race, religion, 
gender, and national origin, the First Amendment’s “Ministerial Exception’’ shields churches 
from the prohibition of discrimination based on religion under that statute and any other 
enactments.2 Likewise, Title VII grants much broader exceptions through §702 to allow certain 
religious groups under particular circumstances to do the same.3  
  
  This Note will accept the Ministerial Exception, recognizing that the constitutional 
freedom of any institution deemed a “church” to select ministers or clergy without interference 
from the government or Title VII’s restrictions is, to a great extent, logical and acceptable. 
                                                 
1 Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 781 (2007) 
2 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 (West 2014).  
3 Id. § 2000e-1(a).  
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Otherwise, such intrusion could potentially trample upon religious rights.  
  
  Rather, this Note addresses the often arbitrary application of Title VII’s exceptions 
regarding employment decisions by other religious organizations, not churches, affecting other 
positions, not ministerial, within the religious organization. Part II of this Note provides a basic 
description and background of the Ministerial Exception and Title VII’s statutory exceptions, 
laying out their application requirements, constitutional grounds, and scope of immunity. Part II 
also addresses and highlights the differences that distinguish them.  
  
  Part III examines how the impact of the Ministerial Exception's absolute immunity on the 
operation of Title VII exceptions’ partial immunity in effect allows religious organizations to 
discriminate on a basis other than religion, particularly sex. This is despite the fact that such 
discrimination is explicitly prohibited, unless such   discrimination is justified as “a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that” religious 
organization.4 In other words, even though a religious organization may be able to consider an 
applicant or employee’s religion without violating Title VII, such organization may in effect 
violate the statute by considering the individual’s sex, for instance, under the guise of religion.5  
  
    
  
II.   MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION VS. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS 
  
                                                 
4 Id. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(1); see also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh–Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 
1164, 1166-67 (4th Cir.1985).  
5 Id. § 2000e-1(a). 
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A.   The Ministerial Exception: Absolute Protection Granted by the Constitution  
  
  
  
  The Ministerial Exception is a constitutional doctrine rooted in both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause.6 It applies primarily to churches’ selection of ministers, 
granting a protection afforded by the First Amendment of the Constitution.7   The Supreme Court 
long recognized that the “freedom to select the clergy” has “federal constitutional protection as 
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference,”8 but that right was most absolutely 
and clearly stated in the Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. Perich, which made clear that the right is absolute.9 In its quest to protect religious 
organizations’ right to choose spiritual leaders, the Exception, where applicable, trumps all 
federal and state anti-discrimination laws.10 Thus, if a defendant is deemed a church and the 
position at issue is ministerial, the right is absolute, both at the federal and state level, and little 
can be done to redress religious discrimination against employees.11  
  
  Since Title VII’s statutory nondiscriminatory requirements may interfere with the 
constitutional freedom specific to clergy, the Ministerial Exception, as a constitutional and thus 
unyielding protection, reconciles Title VII with the First Amendment by allowing religious 
                                                 
6 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012).  
7 Id. at 697; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
8 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). For an analysis of the extent to which the judiciary 
may decide religious disputes see CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., APPLICATION OF RELIGIOUS LAW 
IN U.S. COURTS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2011), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41824.pdf.  
9 132 S. Ct. at 706.  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
 5 
organizations to select clergy without regard to any of Title VII’s restrictions.12 If, however, the 
Ministerial Exception does not apply either because the employer is not a church or the position 
at issue is not ministerial, the inquiry as to whether any discrimination protection applies 
branches out to any of the other potentially viable statutory exceptions. Thus, employment 
decisions regarding other positions within the organization may still have to comply with Title 
VII’s statutory requirements. 
  
1.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to set the tone and lay the framework for the 
Ministerial Exception through Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. Perich 
  
  
  
  
  
  When the Supreme Court first faced the potential for impermissible review of 
ecclesiastical decisions, it avoided the issue.13 In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton 
Christian Schools, decided in 1985, the plaintiff, a pregnant teacher, was married.14 However, 
when she became pregnant, the Dayton Christian Schools decided not to renew her teaching 
contract.15 The schools' sponsoring churches adhered to the view that a mother of young children 
should not work outside the home.16 The teacher retained a lawyer who informed the school that 
it was violating federal and state anti-discrimination law.17 The school then fired the teacher for 
                                                 
12  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–1(a) (West 2014); see also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir.1972) 
(holding that Congress left to the judiciary the task of deciding how Title VII applies to religious organizations. The 
judiciary's response, first articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was to create a “ministerial 
exception,” which exempted the employment relationship between churches and their ministers from Title VII); 
Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947–49 (3d Cir.1991) (subjecting religious employer to a claim of religious 
discrimination would raise substantial questions under the Religion Clauses);  Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; Rayburn, 
772 F.2d at 1167 (“perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its values, 
teach its message, and interpret its doctrines”). 
13  See generally Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619 (1985). 
14 Id. at 623. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
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violating its practice of Biblical Chain of Command, a belief that all disputes involving members 
of the church should be resolved within the church.18  
  
  Following this action, the teacher filed a sex discrimination complaint with the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission.19 The school then filed its own lawsuit in federal court, arguing that its free 
exercise of religion prohibited the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or 
“Commission”) from investigating discrimination claims at the school.20 Even though the school 
lost in the district court, the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.21 But the 
Court did not reach the merits of the claim, instead concluding that the federal courts should not 
have interfered in the ongoing state proceedings.22 
  
  When the Supreme Court reviewed Hosanna-Tabor almost thirty years later, it 
recognized the Ministerial Exception for the first time.23 In Hosanna-Tabor, the EEOC brought 
an action against a Lutheran church on behalf of a “called” teacher, alleging that the church’s 
school fired the teacher in retaliation for threatening to file an Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) lawsuit following a “proposed release” (i.e. discharge) allegedly due to a narcolepsy 
diagnosis and symptoms.24 The teacher claimed unlawful retaliation under both the ADA and 
state law.25 The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in 
favor of the congregation and subsequently denied reconsideration, but the Sixth Circuit vacated 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 Dayton, 477 U.S. at 623-24. 
20 Id. at 624-25. 
21 Id. at 625, 629. 
22 Id. at 625. 
23 132 S. Ct. at 706.  
24 Id. at 700-01.  
25 Id. at 701.  
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and remanded.26 However, the Supreme Court reversed, first recognizing the Ministerial 
Exception operated as an affirmative defense to conduct that would otherwise violate the statute 
and then holding that a “called” teacher is a “minister” within the Ministerial Exception.27 
  
  Since the members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers, the 
Supreme Court held that requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister or punishing 
a church for failing to do so intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.28 Such action 
interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.29  By imposing an unwanted minister, the state 
infringes upon the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own 
faith and mission through its appointments.30 It also infringes the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.31 
  
a)  Ministerial Employees  
  
  
  
  Given the Ministerial Exception's constitutional nature, circuit courts across the nation 
recognized the Exception long before Hosanna Tabor.32 However, the circuit courts had differed 
                                                 
26 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008), vacated, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012). 
27 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707-710.  
28 Id. at 706.  
29 Id.  
30 Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
31 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.  
32 See, e.g., Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 
198 (2d
 
Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-04 (3d
 
Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th
 
Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conf. of the United Methodist 
Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th
 
Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007); Alicea- 
Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th
 
Cir. 2003); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal 
Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th
 
Cir. 1991); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th
 
Cir. 
2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648 (10th
 
Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal 
Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th
 
Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. Of Amer., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
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on the scope of the Exception, particularly in regards to which employees qualify as ministerial 
employees.33 Pragmatically, “churches” and “ministers” are both terms of art. While the 
definitions of church and minister have been judicially defined, many employees working for 
religiously-affiliated employers are not considered ministers.34 Hosanna Tabor declined to 
“adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister,” deciding only the 
status of the employee in the case before it.35 Although the Supreme Court has not identified a 
definitive standard, it considered four factors that may be relevant to determining whether an 
employee is ministerial: (1) the formal title given to the employee by the religious institution; (2) 
the substantive actions reflected by the title (i.e., the qualifications required to be granted such a 
title); (3) the employee’s understanding and use of the title; and (4) the important religious 
functions performed by the employees holding that title.36  
  
  Although the Court did not set out a specific test, the Court noted in Hosanna-Tabor that 
(1) the Church held out Perich, a “called teacher” — different from “lay” or “contract” teachers 
who are not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran — to be a minister, (2) 
the Church had a ceremony and the congregation was involved in her investiture, (3) Perich had 
significant religious training as a prerequisite, (4) Perich held herself out to be a minister and 
even took a special tax deduction applicable only to members of a ministry, and (5) her duties 
involved significant religious teaching activities.37 Based on that, the Court decided that Perich 
met the standards of the Ministerial Exception.38 However, the Court was careful to note that the 
                                                 
33 Id.  
34 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.  
35 Id. at 707. 
36 Id. at 708. 
37 Id. at 700, 708-09. 
38 Id. at 709.  
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term "minister" was misleading because the Exception also applies to religions that do not label 
their spiritual leaders “ministers.”39  
  
  Moreover, the Court refused to address the "parade of horribles" that the EEOC presented 
in its arguments against a broad Exception.40 The EEOC and Perich claimed that recognizing the 
Ministerial Exception in employment discrimination suits would confer on religious employers 
“unfettered discretion” to violate employment laws by protecting such organizations from 
liability for actions such as hiring children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States 
and retaliating against employees for reporting criminal misconduct or for testifying before a 
grand jury or in a criminal trial.41 Hosanna-Tabor, on the other hand, argued that the Exception 
had been recognized in the lower courts for forty years and, because it applied only to suits by or 
on behalf of ministers themselves, had not given rise to the dire consequences that the EEOC and 
Perich predicted.42 Focusing solely on the employment discrimination suit before it, brought on 
behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision to fire her, the Supreme Court construed 
its holding narrowly by ruling only that the Ministerial Exception bars suits of that nature.43 In 
other words, the Supreme Court avoided deciding the applicability of the Exception under other 
circumstances.44 
  
B.   Title VII and its Statutory Exceptions  
  
  
  
                                                 
39 Id. at 711-12 (Alito, J., concurring).  
40 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
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1.  Title VII’s Prohibition of Discrimination and Exceptions   
  
  
  
  Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against someone on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex or to retaliate against a person because the person 
complained about discrimination, filed a charge, or participated in an employment discrimination 
investigation or lawsuit.45 Employers with fewer than fifteen employees are exempt.46  
  
  While prohibiting employment discrimination on other grounds, sections 702 and 703 of 
Title VII include several much broader exceptions for religious organizations, regardless of 
whether the organization is a “church” or the employee a “minister.”47 Through §702, religious 
organizations have been granted congressional permission to discriminate based on religion.48 In 
other words, Title VII’s prohibition against religious discrimination does not apply to “a 
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the 
employment, i.e., hiring and retention, of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society of its activities.”49 However, the exception is limited on its face to allowing such 
employers to hire and retain “individuals of a particular religion.”50 The Supreme Court has 
unanimously upheld the constitutionality of exceptions allowing a religiously affiliated not-for-
profit entity to make employment decisions based on religion, even if the position is related to a 
                                                 
45 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2014).  
46 Id.  
47 Id. §§ 2000e-1, 2000e-2(e)(2).  
48 Id.  
49 Id. § 2000e-1(a). 
50 Id.  
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non-religious activity of the organization.51 
  
 In addition, faith-based service providers are also eligible for the exception as long as 
they fit within the definition.52 However, if such organizations receive government funding, the 
funds cannot be used to advance the organization’s religious practices.53 Furthermore, in the 
context of Title VII, the exceptions in Sections 702 and 703 for religious organizations, unlike 
the Ministerial Exception rooted in the Constitution, are not absolute because the exceptions do 
not allow qualifying organizations to discriminate on any other basis forbidden by Title VII (i.e., 
race, color, sex/gender, and national origin).54 Thus, although a religious organization may 
consider an employee or applicant’s religion without violating Title VII, the organization may 
still violate Title VII if it considers the individual’s race, color, national origin, or sex.55 
  Moreover, the exceptions in Title VII appear to apply only with respect to employment 
decisions regarding hiring and firing of employees based on religion.56  Once an organization 
decides to employ an individual, the organization may not discriminate on the basis of religion 
regarding the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, privileges, 
etc.57  In other words, religious organizations that decide to hire individuals with other religious 
beliefs cannot later choose to discriminate against those individuals with regard to wages or other 
benefits that the organization provides to employees.58 
  
                                                 
51 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 333 (1987).  
52 Id.  
53 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). 
54 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1(a) (West 2014); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166–67.  
55 See E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982); E.E.O.C. NOTICE, N-915, September 
23, 1987. 
56 E.E.O.C. NOTICE, N-915, September 23, 1987. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
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a)     Religious  Organizations   
  
  
  
  Problematic enough, the statute does not particularly define “religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society,”59 and there is no definitive judicial standard to 
determine whether an organization qualifies for the exception. To illustrate the confusion, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in one case issued three opinions, each applying a 
different standard, a situation that does more than highlight the varied understanding of the scope 
of such exception.60 
  
  However, the court later amended its decision and issued a majority opinion adopting 
four criteria that a religious organization must satisfy to qualify for the exception.61 The court’s 
standard would recognize that an entity is not subject to Title VII “if it is organized for a 
religious purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying out that religious purpose, holds itself out to 
the public as an entity for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not engage primarily or 
substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts.”62 The 
Supreme Court declined to review the case, leaving lower courts without a uniform standard to 
apply.63 Despite the lack of a uniform standard, lower court decisions have generally appeared to 
agree upon several factors relevant to deciding whether an organization qualifies for the 
exception.64 
  
                                                 
59 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1(a) (West 2014).  
60 See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 619 F.3d 1109 (9th
 
Cir. 2010).  
61 See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011).  
62 Id. at 724.  
63 Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 96 (2011). 
64 See Footnote 32. 
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  To qualify as a “religious” organization permitted to engage in religious discrimination, an 
entity must be owned or significantly controlled by an established religious group.65An 
organization may be deemed religious, even if not directly affiliated with a religious group, as 
long as it is organized for a religious and ethical purpose and is primarily engaged in pursuing 
that purpose, holds itself out to the public as engaging in that defined purpose, and refrains from 
significant commercial enterprises.66 
  
(1)   Religious Educational Institutions: Schools and Universities 
  
  
  
  Another exception in Title VII, §703(e) (2), applies specifically to religious educational 
institutions.67  It allows such institutions “to hire and employ employees of a particular 
religion if [the institution] is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or 
managed by a particular religion or by a particular [organization], or if the curriculum of [the 
institution] is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.”68  
  
  In Killinger v. Samford Univ., the Eleventh Circuit held that educational institutions 
connected to an organized religion  claiming the exception will be analyzed in terms of 1) the 
extent of the relationship of the school to an organized religious group, 2) the history and stated 
mission of the school, 3) the funding and administrative influence on the institution by a 
religious order, 4) the religious orientation of its curriculum, and 5) the religious affiliation of its 
                                                 
65 LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Cntr. Ass’n., 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007).  
66  Spencer, 633 F.3d at 742.  
67 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (West 2014).  
68 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (West 2014).  
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students and faculty.69 
  
  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that seven percent of the school’s funding from the church 
was sufficient to make the educational institution “religious.”70 Merely being founded by a 
religious organization and maintaining a formal yet distant identification to the specific religion, 
however, is not sufficient to make an educational institution “religious,” especially when the 
school’s modern mission, goals, activities, finance, direction, and curriculum are predominantly 
secular.71 
  
(2)  “Bona Fide Occupational Qualification” 
  
  
  
  Another exception provided in Title VII allows employers to discriminate on the basis of 
religion, sex, or national origin if those factors are “a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”72  
  
 However, this exception based on bona fide occupational qualifications has been construed 
narrowly.73 Accordingly, courts have deemed valid discriminatory qualifications to arise only in 
situations where religion plays an extremely significant part of the work environment, including, 
for example, jobs where employee safety is threatened because of the employee’s religious 
                                                 
69 113 F.3d 196, 198-201 (11th Cir. 1997). 
70 Id. at 201.  
71 E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993).  
72 Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
73 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
 15 
affiliation.74 
  
b)     Commercial Entities Not Entitled to the Exception     
  
  
  
 While this immunity has not been held to apply to corporations and purely secular 
businesses in a religious discrimination context under Title VII, the Supreme Court may consider 
that it does. In EEOC v. Tawney Eng. & Mfg. Co., 75  a purely secular for-profit business required 
its employees to attend employer-organized religious services; nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit 
held that a purely secular for-profit business is not a “religious organization.” 76 As a result, a 
secular for-profit entity is thereby not entitled to discriminate on the basis of religion merely 
because of its owners’ individual religious beliefs.77  
 However, the Supreme Court held in the notorious recent case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. that the religious beliefs of a closely held for-profit company's owners trumped the 
personal rights of its women employees.78 More specifically, the Court ruled that “person" within 
the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)79’s protection of a person's 
exercise of religion includes for-profit corporations, even though the RFRA itself does not define 
“person."80 The Supreme Court relied on the Dictionary Act’s definition of "person" to reach that 
conclusion.81 The Court further stated in Burwell that it has entertained RFRA claims brought by 
                                                 
74 See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F.Supp. 1196, 1199-1200 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (allowing an employer to require 
that helicopter pilots convert to Islam in order to be hired for air surveillance over Mecca because Saudi Arabian law 
prohibited any non-Muslim from entering the holy area, a violation punishable by death), aff’d, 746 F.2d 810 (5th
 
Cir. 1984). 
75 EEOC v. Townley Eng. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).  
79 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.  
80 134 S. Ct. at 2768-69.  
81 Id. at 2768.  
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nonprofit corporations because a nonprofit corporation can be a “person” within the meaning of 
RFRA, so the argument cannot be made that RFRA does not reach closely held for-profit 
corporations.82 In other words, in Justice Alito's words in the majority opinion, “[n]o known 
understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some but not all corporations.”83  
  The Court, however, suggested that its holding did not apply to publicly traded 
corporations because of the difficulty of ascertaining the “beliefs” of such corporations and 
because it is highly unlikely that such sort of corporate giants will even assert RFRA claims.84 
Likewise, the Court clarified that this ruling did not necessarily apply to other aspects of health 
coverage such as transfusions, medications derived from pigs, anesthesia, pills coated with 
gelatin, or vaccinations that might be objectionable to a religious owner.85 Lastly, Burwell 
seemed to suggest that closely held corporations may not discriminate in hiring based on 
"religion," but the majority's list of off-limits discrimination does not include sexual 
orientation.86  
  
2.  Constitutionality of Exempting Entities from the Prohibition of Discrimination on 
Account of Religion 
  
  
  
  In Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, an employee at a non-profit gymnasium, 
affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, challenged the validity of one of 
the religious discrimination exceptions granted by Title VII.87 The employee, a janitor, was 
                                                 
82 Id. at 2769.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 2773-75. 
85 Id. at 2805. 
86 Id. at 2783. 
87 483 U.S. at 331. 
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terminated from employment because he was not a member of the Mormon Church.88 Arguing 
that his activities were merely that of a janitor in a gymnasium open to the public and therefore 
non-religious, he claimed that the Exception was unconstitutional for favoring religion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause.89 The Court concluded that Congress passed the religious 
exception contained in §702 for the purpose of “alleviating significant governmental interference 
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”90 
  
 The Court further recognized that Congress intended the exceptions under Title VII to 
cover “all activities of a religious employer.”91 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
exception did not apply to a janitor position because, as Justice Brennan posited, “determining 
that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious mission, and that only 
those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious 
community defines itself.”92   
   While the question of the constitutionality of §702 as applied to for-profit activities of 
religious organizations was not addressed in Amos,93 Burwell may have implicitly resolved that 
question when the Supreme Court upheld a for-profit corporation's free exercise of religion.94 In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that a contraceptives mandate under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially burdened the exercise of religion and thus violated the 
constitutional and statutory protections of religious freedom of for-profit, closely held 
                                                 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 339. 
91 Id.  
92 Amos, 483 U.S. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
93 Id. at 339.  
94 134 S. Ct. at 2769.  
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corporations and individuals who owned or controlled the corporations.95 The Court determined 
that such action contravened the employers' religious beliefs by forcing them to provide health 
insurance coverage for what they sincerely viewed as abortion-inducing drugs and devices, as 
well as related education and counseling.96 Since the Supreme Court drew no distinction between 
for-profit and nonprofit organizations with respect to the free exercise of religion, such a 
distinction may no longer govern the Title VII exceptions.   
  
  
  
III.   TITLE VII EXCEPTIONS: WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION AS OPPOSED 
TO, SAY, SEX? 
  
  
  
  Civil rights groups have focused on the narrow question of whether religious organizations 
can use religion as a basis for employment decisions without encroaching upon potential 
intersections between racial, genders or sexuality related issues.97 Arguably, the exceptions 
granted for the prohibition of religious discrimination by Title VII can serve as a shield for 
religious organizations from being obligated to hire and retain employees who do not share the 
same religious denomination as the institution. The premise is reasonable in theory; however, it 
can be wide reaching in practice and inimical to the purpose of Title VII's enactment.  
  
  It is one thing to allow religious entities to discriminate based on "religion" and another to 
grant them broad discretion to define what constitutes “religious” matters, considering how there 
are nearly as many ways to interpret the Bible and other religious texts as there are people on 
                                                 
95 Id. at 2779.  
96 Id.  
97 See, e.g., Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763 (W.D. Ky. 2001). 
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earth. Although religious institutions are allowed to discriminate based only on “religion,” these 
institutions can still possibly successfully discriminate based on sex. For instance, although it 
was decided almost three decades before Hosanna-Tabor and did not resolve a Title VII claim, 
Madsen v. Erwin98 serves to illustrate the dilemma as to whether discrimination is “religious” 
(legal) or based on sex (illegal).  
  
  In Madsen, which involved the Boy Scouts' exclusionary policies, the plaintiff was 
employed as a sportswriter for the Christian Science Monitor, a church-published newspaper.99 
When the plaintiff was terminated because of her sexual orientation, she sued, claiming 
constitutional, statutory, and common law claims.100 The court held that the plaintiff's civil rights 
claims under both the federal and state constitutions could not constitutionally proceed --not 
because she was a minister, but because entanglement of the defendants in such litigation would 
involve the court in a review of an essentially ecclesiastical procedure, which is impermissible 
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.101  Otherwise, the court added, if 
Madsen were allowed to collect damages from defendants as a result from being discharged for 
being gay, the defendants would be penalized “for their religious belief that homosexuality is a 
sin for which one must repent.”102  
  
  However, the court in Madsen allowed the plaintiff to proceed with her claims for 
defamation, interference with advantageous relations, interference with employment contract, 
                                                 
98 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985). 
99 Id. at 1161.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 1166.  
102 Id. 
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invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress.103 The Madsen court treated the 
plaintiff's tort claims differently because “clergymen may not with impunity defame a person, 
intentionally inflict serious emotional harm on a parishioner, or commit other torts” and then 
claim immunity from liability under the First Amendment's religion provisions.104 Since the 
alleged torts constituted conduct outside of the constitutional constraints, they were subject to 
regulation.105 Since Hosanna-Tabor did not reach broader questions of tort liability, it is not clear 
whether this aspect of Madsen survives, even aside from the question of whether the newspaper 
was sufficiently church-related and whether a sportswriter could be viewed as a minister.106  
  
  In any event, , the majority in Madsen established that the position involved a religious 
activity run by the church and that “‘homosexuality is a deviation from the moral law’ as 
expounded by Christian Science, and that it is expected that every employee of the Church will 
uphold the Church's requisite standard of sexual morality.”107 Relying upon doctrinal 
entanglement concerns and a broad view regarding church autonomy, the court further found that 
the church's decision to fire the plaintiff was a religious decision made by a church as an 
employer.108 
  
                                                 
103 Madsen, 481 N.E.2d at 1167.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. But see Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Cal. Ct. App.. 1989) (involving an action for wrongful 
termination by a Roman Catholic priest, in which the court also dismissed allegations of defamation, invasion of 
privacy, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress). In Higgins, the torts “occurred as inseparable 
parts of a process of divestiture of priestly authority,” and, therefore, were “too close to the peculiarly religious 
aspects of the transaction to be segregated and treated separately as civil wrongs.” Id. at 761. 
106 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 710.  
107  Madsen, 481 N.E.2d at 1164. 
108 Id. at 1165 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevick, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). The court distinguished 
a previous case, Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sc’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), stating that the result in that 
case “did nothing to burden or punish the foundation's exercise of religious beliefs or to exact a penalty for religious 
beliefs.” Id. at 1166. But see Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1642 
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  More recently and in a Title VII context, the employer in Boyd v. Harding Academy of 
Memphis, Inc., 109  a religious school affiliated with the Church of Christ, claimed that 
termination of the employee, a preschool teacher, was based on her violation of the 
organization’s policy against extra-marital sex, stemming from the New Testament’s 
proscription of pre-marital sex.   On the other hand, the employee who filed the action claimed 
that the action was unlawful sex discrimination based on her unwed pregnancy.110 The court held 
that the termination did not violate Title VII because the employer’s decision was based on a 
violation of its faith-based policy, not the resulting pregnancy.111  
  
  The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that Title VII exempted 
religious entities as long as the religious employer made its employment decision upon a 
religious basis or criteria.112 The court reasoned that the employer’s reliance on statements that 
an assistant in the school made to the director about the plaintiff possibly being pregnant,  which, 
if true, would mean that the plaintiff engaged in sex outside of marriage,  did not establish that 
the school’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for her termination was a pretext for gender 
discrimination.113 
  
 In another case, a teacher claimed violations of Title VII, alleging that the employer, a 
religious group, unlawfully discriminated against her when it terminated her from a teaching 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1996) (arguing that the court should have considered whether the plaintiff's job as a writer for the Monitor was 
connected to the Church's religious activity). 
109 887 F. Supp. 157, 158 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) aff'd, 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 162.  
112 Id. at 160; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-1 (West 2014).   
113 Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 162.  
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position for being pregnant and unmarried.114 The court found that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to whether the employer fired the employee because she violated the school's 
religious code, or because of her gender and pregnancy.115  In that case, Redhead v. Conference 
of Seventh-day Adventists, the Eastern District Court of New York reasoned that, although the 
suit was brought against a school operated by a religious organization, the nature of the dispute 
was not such that its resolution would inevitably run afoul of the Establishment Clause by 
impermissibly entangling the court in matters of religious doctrine because the teacher was not a 
clergy member and her duties at the school were primarily secular.116 Thus, the action was not 
barred by the ministerial exception to Title VII.117  
  Unlike Redhead, the teachers in Boyd were required to be Christians and preference was 
given to Church of Christ members.118 Moreover, the teacher in that case was aware of the 
expectations because she knew that the Harding Academy was a church-related school and 
indicated on her employment application that she had a Christian background and believed in 
God.119 
  
A.   Courts’ attempt to draw the line between religion and sex in Little and Geary 
  
  
  
  As these cases illustrate, courts have issued decisions in opposite directions. In Little v. 
Wuerl, the Third Circuit ruled that a Catholic school could refuse to renew the contract of a non-
                                                 
114 Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 566 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the 
Ministerial Exception did not apply when the employer, Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, argued that the 
court lacked jurisdiction because of the Ministerial Exception and claimed that the employee was lawfully 
terminated for violating church doctrine). 
115 Id. at 139.  
116 Id. at 132.  
117 Id.  
118 Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 158.  
119 Id. 
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Catholic teacher whose divorce and remarriage did not conform to Catholic norms.120 The Court 
reasoned that "the permission to employ persons ‘of a particular religion’ includes permission to 
employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with the employer's religious 
precepts."121  
  
  Two years later, the same Court held in Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary 
Parish School that the religious exception did not provide a shield against an age discrimination 
claim by a “lay” teacher who was fired by a church-operated Catholic school for allegedly 
marrying a divorced man.122 While the Third Circuit determined that the First Amendment may 
prohibit application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) to a religious 
organization if there is a significant risk that the First Amendment would be infringed, the Court 
concluded that application of the ADEA to the lay faculty of a religious school does not present a 
significant risk of entanglement.123 To reach that determination in Geary, the Third Circuit 
reasoned that the ADEA's inquiry is only whether the school discriminated against Geary on the 
basis of age, and further, whether the School canceled Geary's insurance in retaliation for her 
suit.124 While Hosanna-Tabor clearly means that religious employers are exempt from Title VII, 
the ADEA, and the ADA as long as they claim the aggrieved employee is a “minister,” the Third 
Circuit's reasoning in Geary highlights that this is so when the constitutional protections of the 
First Amendment are implicated, but not because the ADEA provides statutory religious 
                                                 
120 929 F.2d at 951; see also Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (interpreting § 
2000e-l(a) to allow religious institutions to give hiring preferences to members of the faith, but not to engage in 
other forms of discrimination in the case of an unmarried pregnant teacher fired by a Catholic school). "Indeed, to 
construe section 2000e-l to exempt all forms of discrimination in sectarian schools would itself raise first 
amendment problems since it would imply the government's preference of sectarian schools over nonsectarian 
schools.” Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 269. 
121 Little, 929 F.2d at 951. 
122 7 F.3d 324, 325 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 269. 
123 Geary, 7 F.3d at 326-27, 328 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979)). 
124 Id. at 328.  
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exceptions like those that Title VII provides on top of the Ministerial Exception.  
  
 Other courts have suggested that gender-neutral policies, such as a policy against premarital 
sex by an employee, if applied in a gender-neutral way, avoids potential clashes between a 
religious employer's religious views and the obligation to avoid sex discrimination.125 
  
B.   Pregnancy and Lawful Religion Discrimination  
  
  
  
  The most serious controversies have probably arisen from the treatment of pregnancy by 
religious groups in the employment context.126 The Supreme Court itself has had trouble seeing 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as an instance of sex discrimination.127 In Geduldig v. 
Aiello, decided in 1974, the Court, composed of all male justices at the time, reasoned that the 
two classes of pregnant and non-pregnant persons do not perfectly track gender, as there can be 
non-pregnant women and non-pregnant men.128  
  
  As a response, Congress promptly amended Title VII to include pregnancy-based 
discrimination as a forbidden ground under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; 129  hence, 
employers cannot lawfully discriminate on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
                                                 
125 See Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344, 359-60 (E.D.N.Y 1998) (holding that a sectarian 
private institution "has the right to employ only teachers who adhere to the school's moral code and religious tenets," 
but a factual determination would be necessary to see if even a neutral policy against non-marital sex could be 
discriminatory as applied since it may be easier for a school to discover and penalize the sexual activities of female 
employees). 
126 Minow, supra note 1, at 802.  
127 See Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494(1974). 
128 417 U.S. at 496-97. 
129 Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
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conditions.130 Therefore, employment actions based on religiously-inspired ideas about 
pregnancy could potentially trigger the protection against pregnancy discrimination.131 
  
  However, the statutory amendment could neither alter the constitutional interpretation nor 
address potential tensions between gender and pregnancy anti-discrimination law in regards to 
the exception for religious employers who use religion in employment.132 Thus, when an 
unmarried female employee of a religious organization becomes pregnant, a religious employer 
may seek to terminate the employment relationship not because of the pregnancy per se but 
because the individual engaged in non-marital sexual relations, which is contrary to religious 
teachings, or because the individual is no longer an adequate role model.133 
  
  In one case, a teacher at a Catholic school lost her job after she became pregnant and 
indicated that she did not plan to marry the father.134 The teacher’s termination followed a 
positive performance review in which her supervisors praised her superior teaching ability and 
her "high degree of professionalism.”135 The matter became one of contract terms since the 
teacher had signed a contract accepting the rule in the school's personnel handbook stating that "a 
teacher is required to convey the teachings of the Catholic faith by his or her words and actions, 
                                                 
130 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 2014).  
131 See Id. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-1(a). 
132 Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 715, 742 (1998). 
133 See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 929 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 
1987) (holding that an employment rule that requires termination of employees who get pregnant out of wedlock is 
not a violation of Title VII); see also Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 805-08 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992).   
134 John Leo, The Case of Michelle McCusker, TOWNHALL.COM (Dec. 5, 2005), 
http://townhall.com/columnists/johnleo/2005/12/05/the_case_of_michelle_mccusker/page/full. 
135 Catholic School Cannot Discriminate Against Unwed Pregnant Teacher, EEOC Rules, NEW YORK CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.nyclu.org/news/catholic-school-cannot-discriminate-against-unwed-
pregnant-teacher-eeoc-rules.  
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demonstrating an acceptance of Gospel values and the Christian tradition.”136 However, the 
teacher did not file any claim under Title VII or any other anti-discrimination law, leaving this 
particular case as a mere illustration of how the arbitrary nature of religious protections can 
deprive thousands of teachers, doctors, nurses, and many other professionals of critical 
employment protections.  While the case did not reach the courts, the decision came in the form 
of a ruling from the EEOC.137 The EEOC issued a notice, finding that the school, St. Rose of 
Lima in Rockaway Beach, New York, was engaging in unlawful pregnancy discrimination by 
firing Michelle McCusker.138 
   While, in theory, the exception allowing religious employers to discriminate on the basis 
of religion does not permit discrimination on the basis of gender or pregnancy per se, a court 
could accept a defense that compliance with the Christian tradition is a bona fide occupational 
requirement.139 For instance, in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, a case that came before the 
District Court in Nebraska involving a discrimination claim brought by an unmarried counselor 
that became pregnant, the Omaha Girls' Club successfully defended against it on the theory that 
she was supposed to provide a role model to adolescent girls.140 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
decision and later denied rehearing the case.141 In Vigars v. Valley Christian Center of Dublin, 
Cal., on the other hand, the District Court for the Northern District of California denied a 
summary judgment motion and called for a trial to determine whether the religious school fired 
                                                 
136 Leo, supra note 116.  
137 Catholic School Cannot Discriminate Against Unwed Pregnant Teacher, EEOC Rules, supra note 117.  
138 Id.  
139 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000 e-2(e) (West 2014) (stating that "it shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice to hire and employ employees … on the basis of… sex … in those certain instances where . . . sex … is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise"). 
140 629 F. Supp. at 943, 951-52.  
141 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1988).  
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the librarian because she was pregnant out of wedlock or because she had an adulterous affair.142 
Even though both would seem to violate a Christian lifestyle based upon “a widely recognized 
and sincerely held belief that extramarital sex is a sin,” the court reasoned that, while childbirth 
out of wedlock would be an impermissible reason in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, adultery, otherwise, would be a ground that the Christian school could use to ensure 
compliance with a Christian lifestyle.143 After all, the court posited, adultery is inconsistent with 
“the religious values of the church and school.”144 
  
  However, defendants, a parochial school run by the church, originally asserted in their 
motion to dismiss that plaintiff, the teacher, was fired “for the sin of being pregnant out of 
wedlock,” as she was “pregnant without benefit of marriage,” but later asserted in their summary 
judgment motion that she was fired because “the school learned that she was involved in an 
adulterous relationship (i.e., sexual relations with her ‘new’ husband before she was divorced 
from her ‘old’ husband),” and the resulting pregnancy was evidence of that adulterous 
relationship.”145 
  
C.   Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity Discrimination: Gender Discrimination?  
  
  
  
                                                 
142 805 F. Supp. at 810 (denying summary judgment to a Christian school that fired a librarian who got pregnant out 
of wedlock and holding that such firing was per se sex discrimination). 
143 Id. at 805-806.  
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 804.  
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  The United States workforce includes an estimated 5.4 million lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender ("LGBT") persons.146 No federal statute explicitly prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.147 Thus, employers 
discriminate against LGBT workers with broad immunity from detrimental effects.148 In fact, 
numerous studies have confirmed that LGBT-related employment discrimination is rampant.149 
Lesbian, gay, and bisexual ("LGB") individuals experience sexual orientation-based employment 
discrimination at staggering rates: 8% to 17% have been fired or denied employment, 7% to 41% 
have been verbally or physically harassed by coworkers, and 10% to 19% have been unfairly 
compensated in terms of pay or benefits.150 
  
  Transgender persons experience gender identity-based employment discrimination at 
even greater rates: 47% have been fired or denied employment, 78% have been verbally or 
physically harassed by coworkers, and 7% have been physically assaulted at work.151 
  
1.  EEOC’s Decisions Regarding Gender Identity 
  
                                                 
146 MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A BROKEN 
BARGAIN: DISCRIMINATION, FEWER BENEFITS AND MORE TAXES FOR LGBT WORKERS 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/a-broken-bargain-full-report.pdf. 
147 See Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277 (2014) (noting that a handful of courts perceive 
LGBT-related employment discrimination as actionable sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
148 See Chad A. Readler, Local Government Anti-Discrimination Laws: Do They Make a Difference?, 31 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 777, 778 (1998) (noting that local nondiscrimination ordinances are often poorly publicized and 
weakly enforced). 
149 See S. REP. NO. 113-105, at 14-18 (2013) (discussing studies conducted between 2008 and 2013 that documented 
instances of sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination). 
150 Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Documented Evidence of Employment Discrimination & Its Effects on LGBT 
People, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (July 2011), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/workplace/documented-evidence-of-employment-discrimination-its-
effects-on-lgbt-people/. 
151 JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 56-58 (2011). 
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  The EEOC has found that lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals alleging sex-stereotyping 
are asserting sex discrimination claims under Title VII.152 In support of its decision, the 
Commission relied on a number of notable cases, including the Supreme Court's decision in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which found that discrimination against an individual for failing to 
conform to gender-based stereotypes violates Title VII.153 
  
  Therefore, stereotyping that imposes burdens based on different gender characteristics is 
forbidden.154 In Price Waterhouse, the Court accepted the concept that “gender stereotyping” is a 
form of “sex” discrimination.155 In that case, the plaintiff, a female employee, was denied a 
promotion to a partnership in defendant's accounting firm.156 In making their evaluations, 
decision-makers made comments such as “overcompensated for being a woman,” “a lady 
shouldn’t use such foul language,” and “she was a macho,” and made recommendations that she 
should “walk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry.”157 The court reasoned that the plaintiff was being evaluated on the basis of 
outward characteristics typically associated with the respective sexes, and that such gender 
“stereotyping” constituted sex discrimination.158  Similarly, in Lewis v. Heartland Inns of 
America, L.L.C., a hotel admissions desk clerk was dismissed because she had a “tomboyish” 
rather than a “pretty, Midwestern girl” appearance.159 The Eighth Circuit held that such a 
                                                 
152 Veretto v. U.S. Postal Service, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120110873 (July 1, 2011); Castello v. U.S. Postal Service, 
EEOC Request No. 0520110649 (Dec. 20, 2011). 
153 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) 
154 Id.  
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156 Id. at 231-32. 
157 Id. at 235.  
158 Id. at 250.  
159 591 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 2010).  
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stereotype constituted sex discrimination.160  
  
  Likewise, discrimination against an individual because that person is transgender (known 
as “gender identity discrimination”) is also discrimination because of sex and is therefore 
covered under Title VII.161 In its determination in the 2012 case of Macy v. Holder, the EEOC 
reversed the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") determination that claims of gender identity 
discrimination are ineligible for adjudication under the Executive Order 1614 process and instead 
held "that claims of discrimination based on transgender status, also referred to as claims of 
discrimination based on gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII's sex discrimination 
prohibition.”162   
  
  Significantly, because Macy was decided by the full Commission rather than its Office of 
Federal Operations, the decision is binding on all executive departments and federal agencies 
notwithstanding the fact that Executive Order 11478 does not explicitly include gender identity 
among its protected classes.163 Consequently, federal employees who suffer an adverse 
employment action because of their gender identity now have the same enforcement rights as 
their colleagues who are discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, 
national origin, disability, or age.164 
  
                                                 
160  Id. at 1040.  
161 Macy v. Department of Justice, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20, 2012). 
162 Id. at 5-6. 
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http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak= 7288. 
164 Alex Reed, REDRESSING LGBT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION VIA EXECUTIVE ORDER, 29 ND J. L. 
ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 133, 160 (2015).  
 31 
  
  
2.  Sexual Orientation Discrimination  
  
  
  
  Recently, the Commission also issued a potentially groundbreaking decision finding that 
discrimination based on "sexual orientation" can be brought under Title VII even without any 
further showing of sex stereotyping.165 In so ruling, the Commission rejected several circuit court 
decisions that held that Title VII does not include protection from discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.166 The Commission held, "[s]exual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination 
because it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of the employee's 
sex."167  In reaching its conclusion, the Commission held "[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is premised on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or 
norms.  'Sexual Orientation' as a concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to 
sex."168   
  
  While the EEOC has pronounced that sexual orientation falls under sex and is thus covered 
under Title VII, the Obama Administration recently announced support for amending the Civil 
Rights Act through the Equality Act to protect LGBT people in particular.169 The legislation 
would amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by expanding it to include bans on discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, housing, public 
                                                 
165 Complainant v. Foxx, E.E.O.C., Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 16, 2015). 
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Id.  
169 David Badash, Obama Administration Announces Support For Amending Civil Rights Act To Protect LGBT 
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accommodations, public education, federal funding, credit, and the jury system. 170 
  
  It is precisely because the White House is working “to ensure that the legislative process 
produces something that balances “the bedrock principles of civil rights with the religious liberty 
that we hold dear in this country” that the much broader exceptions under Title VII should be 
closely and critically reexamined given that they can easily get in the way as a cover for implicit 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity, which Title VII 
precisely seeks to prevent.171 
  
a)  Sexual Orientation and Lawful Religion Discrimination  
  
  
  
  Unfortunately, because of the relatively few opinions that address sexual orientation anti-
discrimination laws in the face of religious objection, the Supreme Court has yet to consider the 
question.172 Generally, the lower courts have sided with religious organizations on claims of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.173  
  
  While not a Title VII victory but hopefully persuasive in some way, two gay student 
groups won their challenge, as a statutory matter, to Georgetown University's refusal to grant 
them recognition and access to the kind of resources given to other recognized student groups 
under the local human rights code in Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center 
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171 Id. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2014).  
172 Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment Principles and Anti-
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173 See, e.g., Pedreira, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 762. Besides rejecting claims of sexual orientation discrimination, courts 
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speech, and association. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 33 
v. Georgetown University.174 However, the University did not have to “recognize” the group 
since that would be a religious endorsement.175 Subsequently, Congress, having the authority 
over the District of Columbia, responded by amending the human rights code.176 As a result, 
anti-discrimination norms began to judicially trump claims by religious groups.177 Although 
claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have not generated victories for 
plaintiffs suing religious organizations, neither have they done much to clarify the law.178 
  
  In Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., a Baptist social service agency 
in Kentucky, the state's largest provider of services for troubled youth, fired a therapist for being 
a lesbian.179 The plaintiff, Alice Pedreira, disclosed her sexual orientation during the hiring 
interview, and the director assured her that there was no policy against hiring gays or lesbians 
but that she should be discreet nonetheless.180 After a photograph showing Pedreira wearing a t-
shirt reading “Isle of Lesbos” and posing with her partner, taken before she took the job, 
appeared at an amateur photo display at the state fair, the agency asked for her resignation.181 
Since she declined to resign, she was fired.182  
  
                                                 
174 536 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1987). 
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  Pedreira argued that because the agency received much of its revenues from government 
contracts, the government was illegally funding religiously based employment policies.183 
Therefore, the agency indicated it would refuse further government contracts rather than alter its 
policies.184 Still, the court sided with the Kentucky Baptist Homes, reasoning that the agency was 
allowed to ensure that the conduct of its employees remained consistent with its Christian 
mission and values.185 This case raised questions as to how broadly to define an organization's 
religious tenets as it led to the inquiry of whether “Pedreira's firing [was] a discriminatory 
dismissal based upon her sexual orientation” or “due to her being unable to uphold the religious 
mission or principles of her employer.”186 
  
IV.   CONCLUSION  
  
  
  
  When a religious institution described in §702 and §703 is able to show convincing 
evidence that the challenged employment practice resulted from discrimination on the basis of 
religion, the EEOC is deprived of jurisdiction to further investigate the matter to determine 
whether the religious discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination.187 Yet, 
discrimination might not be clear on its face, specifically if perpetuated and acted upon to 
presumably protect the entity’s “religious” beliefs and practices and to further its “religious” 
                                                 
183 Pedreira, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 763.  
184 Mary Leonard, Judge Sees No Bias in Firing of Lesbian, Ky. Baptist Agency Favored in Ruling, BOSTON 
GLOBE (July 25, 2001), https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8659871.html. As a result of Pedreira's suit, 
Kentucky Baptist Homes, which operates eight residential centers for nearly eight hundred youngsters, threatened to 
not renew its contract if the state attempted to impose anti-bias rules as a condition for funding. Id. “If there was 
ever a time when we had to choose between our standards for role models for children and public dollars, we will 
stick by our values,” declared a spokes-person. Id. See also David Winfrey & Trennis Henderson, Kentucky Baptists 
Establish Committee to Examine Baptist Faith and Message, BAPTIST2BAPTIST (Nov. 27, 2000), 
http://www.baptist2baptist.net/printfriendly.asp?ID=161. 
185 Pedreira, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 761. 
186 AMY E. BLACK ET. AL., OF LITTLE FAITH: THE POLITICS OF GEORGE W. BUSH’S FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES 258 
(2004).  
187 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Mississippi Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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mission, even if there is another actual hidden motive. In some cases, an employer may claim 
that it had a valid discriminatory reason for the discharge based on religion, while the employee 
claims the discharge is based on some other Title VII prohibition and therefore improper. 
  
  Considering how scriptures from which religious precepts have been used to defend 
slavery, demean women, oppress any number of groups in the past, and even kill people, these 
statutory exceptions should be re-examined. There should be a more reasonably approach in 
place or a set of clear factors that courts should be able to consider uniformly. Perhaps it is up to 
the legislature, not the judiciary, to take more effective action. Arguably, this may raise 
entanglement concerns. However, some may argue that the exceptions can be waived or denied 
when their implications have the potential to pose a threat to other protections and liberties 
granted by Title VII or even the Constitution.  
  
  Otherwise, the implication is that an individual removes himself or herself from the 
protections of the civil rights laws by working for a religious organization even if it is in a non-
ministerial capacity. As a consequence, there is no clear distinction as to where permissible 
religious beliefs end and impermissible political views begin. Such suggestion is not reasonable 
for an individual, for instance, whose faith and religion has played a fundamental role in shaping 
his or her concept of identity and personhood and who wants to forge an employment 
relationship with a religious group but who happens to either become pregnant while single or be 
a single mother or be gay, lesbian or transgender. How does that person reconcile his or her own 
free exercise of religion and faith with his or her identity?  
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